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Abstract
The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit
their innovation regardless of its value. This ignores a potential adverse selection
problem. The present paper analyzes the procurement of innovations when the
procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who bypass the contest.
We compare fixed-prize tournaments with and without entry fees, and optimal
scoring auctions with and without minimum score requirement. Our main result
is that the optimal fixed-prize tournament is more profitable than the optimal
auction since preventing bypass is more costly in the optimal auction.
JEL classification: C70, D44, D89, L12, O32
Keywords: innovation, contests, tournaments, auctions, bargaining, adverse
selection
1 Introduction
Contests are a widely used and well documented method to procure innovations. In the
past, fixed-prize tournaments were employed to procure major bottleneck innovations.
For example, in 1795 Napoleon Bonaparte offered a prize of FF12.000 for a method of
food preservation that was in high need to serve his military excursions across Europe.
The winner of that tournament was Nicolas Appert, who invented the method of food
canning, which is still widely used today.1 In 1714 the British Parliament offered
∗We would like to thank Gian Casartelli, Byoung Heon Jun, Susanne Ohlendorf, and Anja Scho¨ttner
for comments. Research support by the Bonn Graduate School of Economics, the SFB Transregio 15,
“Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems” (funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft,
DFG), and the Department of Economics at Korea University in Seoul are gratefully acknowledged.
1In-container sterilization is known as “appertisation” in francophone regions, in memory of Nicolas
Appert.
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a prize of £20.000 for a method of determining longitude at sea, following a series
of maritime disasters. That tournament was won by John Harrison who invented the
first mechanical chronometer to provide reliable time measurement service at sea.2
More recent examples range from the procurement of weapon systems, energy efficient
refrigerators,3 and pharmaceutical innovations, to the awarding of academic grants and
fellowships, to name just a few.
Contests in the form of a scoring auction are also widely used in the procurement of
goods and services that involve innovative activity. For example, when theWorld Bank
procures the design or construction of a power plant or a national health care system,
potential contractors compete not only with price, but also with technical proposals
that lay out innovative solutions to problems of technical or institution design (see The
World Bank, 2004a,b).
Elements of a research contest are also present in architecture competitions where
designers and contractors are typically asked to present pilot proposals that are re-
warded with fixed cash prizes and that play a crucial role in the final selection.
Inspired by these and other examples, R&D contests were analyzed extensively in
the recent theoretical literature. In his seminal paper Taylor (1995) introduced a model
of innovation activity that has been widely used in the subsequent literature. In that
model, innovations are measured by their value added (the increment in wealth that
their application would induce), and innovation activities are viewed as costly draws
from a given i.i.d. probability distribution of innovations, similar to the independent
private-values model in auction theory.
Fullerton and McAfee (1999) extended this analysis by introducing asymmetric
innovators whose cost of innovation differ, and addressed the important issue of how
to induce the best selection of contestants through auctioning participation rights. And
Fullerton, Linster, McKee, and Slate (2002), as well as Scho¨ttner (2008) compared the
profitability of procuring innovations by fixed-prize tournaments and auctions, while
Che and Gale (2003) analyzed private-value contests from an optimal mechanism de-
sign perspective, assuming a deterministic innovation technology and excluding entry
fees.
The literature on R&D contests implicitly assumes that contestants submit their
best innovation regardless of its value. This assumption ignores that innovators may
withhold innovations that are worth considerably more than the prize, so that only the
lemons, i.e., the inferior innovations are submitted. If there is only one potential user
of the innovation, i.e., if the procurer is a monopsonist, the procurer can in principle
prevent this adverse selection problem by committing himself to never bargain with
innovators who bypass the contest. However, such a commitment is difficult to achieve.
There are many cases where innovations were inspired by a contest, but innova-
tors ultimately decided to bypass the contest when they felt that their innovation had a
substantially higher commercial value than the prize offered by the contest, and then
successfully negotiated more profitable license agreements after bypassing the con-
2However, the prize committee was dominated by astronomers who pursued their own agenda, sabo-
taged the work of the clockmaker, and tried to withhold the prize from him. For a vivid account of these
incidents see Sobel (1996).
3In 1991 a $10 million prize was sponsored. Whirlpool won the tournament but never collected the
prize because it failed to sell the 250.000 units required within the first five years after the tournament
(see Langreth, 1994).
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test.4
For example, the inventor John Wesley Hyatt was encouraged to develop a new
substance after he saw an advertisement by Phelan & Collander, offering $10,000 to
the person who invented a usable substitute for ivory in billiard balls. Hyatt eventually
succeeded by inventing celluloid, which seemed to be a perfect and cheap substitute
for ivory in billiard balls, but finally decided to patent his innovation in 1869 instead of
submitting it to the tournament and collecting the prize.5 This bypass of the fixed-prize
tournament allowed him to more profitably license his innovation not only for use in
billiard balls, but also in a variety of other products, ranging from film and ping-pong
balls to dental plates.6
Motivated by this and other examples, the present paper analyzes the procurement
of innovations when the procurer is unable to commit to never bargain with innovators
and innovators consider to bypass a contest in the event that they draw a high value
innovation, when the value of innovation is not verifiable to third parties, and when
the benefits of innovation accrue exclusively to the procurer. We compare two differ-
ent methods to procure innovations: fixed-prize tournaments and incentive compatible
(scoring) auctions, and determine which of these mechanisms is more profitable for
the procurer if both mechanisms are potentially subject to a bypass and subsequent
lemons problem.7
Our main finding is that this imperfect commitment generally affects the profitabil-
ity of both mechanisms, but in substantially different ways, and depending on whether
one employs a standard fixed-prize tournament or amends it by requiring advance reg-
istration and entry fees, just like in the optimal auction.
Altogether, we show that the optimal fixed-prize tournament outperforms the op-
timal auction. Specifically, we construct a simple fixed-prize tournament that prevents
bypass (just like the optimal auction) and matches the profitability of the optimal auc-
tion. However, we also identify cases in which the optimal fixed-prize tournament is
strictly more profitable than the optimal auction. Interestingly, a standard fixed-prize
tournament that does not employ entry fees can be more profitable than the optimal
auction that employs entry fees.
The intuition for this surprising result is as follows. When no registration/entry
fee is required in a fixed-prize tournament, both innovators have the option to submit
their innovation. Therefore, in order to prevent bypass it is sufficient to employ a sim-
ple fixed-prize tournament without entry fees and set the smallest prize that assures
submission when both innovators have the option to submit. Whereas, once registra-
tion/entry fees are imposed, preventing bypass requires not only that innovators always
exercise an option to submit, but also that they buy the option to submit. Altogether,
assuring both advance registration and subsequent submission can be more costly than
4See the excellent survey by Cabral, Cozzi, Denicolo´, Spagnolo, and Zanza (2006).
5As reported in Wikipedia (see the entry under “John Wesley Hyatt”), “the English inventor Daniel
Spill developed the same product which he patented in England as ‘Xylonite’, and later pursued Hyatt in a
number of costly court cases between 1877 and 1884. The eventual outcome found that the true inventor
of celluloid was Alexander Parkes, and that all manufacturing of celluloid could continue, including
Hyatt’s.”
6Despite its initial success, the popularity of celluloid billiard balls diminished rapidly after a number
of incidents caused by the high flammability of celluloid.
7For a survey of alternative methods to procure innovations see Scotchmer (2005).
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adopting a simple fixed-prize contest that requires no registration/entry fees.
In addition to proving the optimality of the optimal fixed-prize tournament, we also
provide sufficient conditions for ranking the optimal standard fixed-prize tournament
(without entry fees) with the optimal auction. And we also show that the auction
cannot be improved by adding a minimum score requirement in addition to entry fees.
The plan of the paper is as follows: sections 2 and 3 introduce the model and show
that the optimal auction and fixed-prize tournament are revenue equivalent under per-
fect commitment. In section 4 we compare the profitability of the two mechanisms
under imperfect commitment, when innovators may bypass the mechanism. In section
5 we show that the appropriately generalized fixed-prize tournament is more profitable
than the optimal auction. And in section 6 we also show that the auction cannot be im-
proved by applying a minimum score requirement in addition to requestding payment
of entry fees. The paper closes with a discussion in section 7.
2 The model
A risk neutral procurer wishes to buy an innovation from one of two short-listed inno-
vators, using either a fixed-prize tournament or a (scoring) auction. The procurer can
commit to employ one of these mechanisms, but is unable to commit to never trade
with an innovator who bypassed it.
Innovation technology: Innovation is modeled as one i.i.d. random draw x from
the c.d.f. G : [x, x¯]→ [0,1] with positive density g everywhere, at cost c > 0. The
random variable X measures the increment in wealth that result if the procurer adopts
it. The innovation has no value for anyone other than the procurer. G is such that
H(x) := ∫ x
0
G(y)dy is log-concave for all x .8 For convenience, the support of G is
normalized to [0,1]. Order statistics of the sample of two random draws are denoted
by X(1) ≥ X(2) (as a rule, random variables are denoted by capital and realizations by
lowercase letters).
Information: Innovations are innovators’ private information. That information
becomes known to the procurer only after the innovation has been submitted either to
the contest or to the bargaining table (and at the bargaining may be revealed to another
innovator). Innovations are not verifiable to third parties, which restricts the set of
feasible auction rules and rules out the use of bilateral contracts.
Contest mechanisms: The procurer adopts either a fixed-prize contest or a (scor-
ing) auction. In the fixed-prize contest the procurer sets a prize p to be paid to the best
submitted innovation and possibly an entry fee, f , to be paid by innovators who regis-
ter for the contest. If an innovator registers, innovates, and submits his innovation, he
earns p− f − c if he wins and − f − c if he loses. In the auction, the procurer selects
a scoring rule, a pricing rule, and an entry fee f . The scoring rule maps an innovation,
x , and a financial proposal, b (the smallest price requested for the innovation), into a
score, S, and then selects the highest scoring bid as winner. The pricing rule maps bids
into a price that the winner shall pay.
Since innovations are not verifiable by third parties, the only incentive-compatible
scoring rule is the non-discriminating rule, S(x,b)= x−b, that scores bids by the net
8Log-concavity is frequently assumed in information economics (see the survey by Bagnoli and
Bergstrom, 2005). The assumed log-concavity of H is obviously weaker than log-concavity of G.
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surplus that they promise to deliver to the procurer; and the only incentive-compatible
pricing rule is that of the first-score auction that requires the procurer to pay the winner
the price he requested, b (see Che and Gale, 2003). This does, however, not rule out,
that one may use a non-incentive-compatible auction, like the second-score auction, as
a proxy of the first-score auction.
Since innovators may bypass the contest prescribed by the procurer, the contest
rules do not fully describe the game played between the procurer and innovators. In
addition, we need to consider the bargaining game between innovator and procurer
that applies in the event when one or both innovators bypass the contest.
Bargaining in the event of bypass: Neither do innovators know each other nor does
the procurer reveal their identity. Therefore, if a bypass has occurred, the subsequent
bargaining game is one between two players: the procurer and the innovator who owns
the best bypassed innovation, provided that the bypassed innovation is superior to the
submitted innovation, if any innovation was submitted.
The outcome of the two-players bargaining game is described by the symmetric
Nash bargaining solution in which the gains from trade are shared equally.9
Specifically, if one innovator submitted his innovation while the other bypassed,
the procurer already owns the submitted innovation. He then bargains only if the
innovator who proposed to bargain has the superior innovation. In that event, the
procurer’s threat point is equal to X(2); therefore, the Nash bargaining equilibrium
price is equal to P = 1/2(X(1)− X(2)) .
Whereas if both innovators have bypassed, the procurer bargains only with the
owner of the superior innovation but threatens to buy the inferior innovation. Again,
assuming a symmetric Nash bargaining solution, the procurer’s threat point is 1/2X(2).
Therefore, the procurer buys only the superior innovation at a price equal to P =
1/2
(
X(1)− 1/2X(2)
)= 1/2X(1)− 1/4X(2).
Timeline: At date 0, the procurer announces the contest rule. At date 1, each inno-
vator simultaneously registers for the contest and pays an entry fee or does not register
(bypass may already occur at this point), if registration is required. At date 2, inno-
vators simultaneously draw an innovation (or do not innovate), not knowing whether
their rival has registered for the contest. At date 3, innovators privately observe their
innovation and either submit it to the contest or bypass it. If an auction is adopted,
submission requires choice of a financial bid. If at least one innovation was submitted,
at date 4 the mechanism game is executed, the winner/loser is selected and the winner
is paid. If an innovator has bypassed the mechanism, at date 5, this innovator proposes
bargaining, and the procurer bargains with him if and only if he has drawn the superior
innovation.
Finally, we assume that the procurer is subject to a sufficiently high loss in the
event that no procurement takes place. This is the case when the support of the random
innovation is sufficiently bounded away from zero, so that x > 0.10 Normalizing that
support of X to [0,1] then means that a zero profit from no procurement is transformed
into a negative profit of no procurement, equal to −x .11
9This is supported by the solutions of standard bargaining games such as the Rubinstein (1982) model
of sequential offer-counteroffer bargaining (provided players are equally impatient, and the time interval
between offers is small) and the axiomatic bargaining theory by Nash (1950).
10This is typically the case when the procurement concerns some bottleneck innovation.
11This fact is often overlooked. For example, it is often claimed that the optimal standard single-unit
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We also assume that the cost of drawing an innovation is sufficiently low so that
procuring innovations does not require subsidizing innovators. This is assured by as-
suming that c ≤ 1/2E [X(1)− X(2)].
3 Optimal mechanisms under perfect commitment
As a benchmark, we first assume that the procurer can commit to never negotiate with
innovators who do not participate in the mechanism, and does so. We consider a
standard fixed-prize tournament where the procurer offers to pay a fixed prize p for
the best submitted innovation, and a scoring auction described by a scoring rule, a
pricing rule, and entry fee f .
Optimal fixed-prize tournament The tournament game has a unique equilibrium
outcome: the procurer sets the smallest prize that assures that both innovators innovate
and submit their innovation (see Taylor, 1995). The equilibrium prize, p∗, and payoffs
of the procurer, π∗p , and innovators, π
∗
i , are
p∗ = 2c (1)
π∗p = E[X(1)]− p∗ = E[X(1)]−2c (2)
π∗i =
1
2
p∗− c = 0. (3)
Note, if the procurer would set a smaller prize, p ∈ [c,2c), innovators would play
mixed strategies. Given our assumption concerning the cost of “no procurement”, the
procurer will never set a price that induces mixed strategies since this would involve
that procurement fails with positive probability.
Also, note that the tournament is optimal for the procurer and thus cannot be im-
proved by another mechanism, because it is constrained efficient, (maximizes the gain
from trade conditional on having two innovation draws) and gives the entire surplus to
the procurer.
Scoring Auction In a scoring auction, bids are two-dimensional, (xi ,bi ); where xi
is the value of the innovation, and bi the minimum price requested for this innovation.
Bids are scored by a non-discriminatory scoring rule Si (xi ,bi ) := xi − bi that ranks
innovations by their value-added for the procurer, and, for analytical simplicity, assume
a second-score auction format. There, the highest score wins, and the winner receives
the price that makes his score match the second highest score.
At the time of bidding, the cost of innovation, c, is already sunk. Therefore, in the
second-score auction, it is an equilibrium in dominant strategies to bid a score equal to
the value of the innovation, xi .
12 The associated equilibrium price, P , then solves the
equation X(1)− P = S(2) = X(2), which gives
P = X(1)− X(2). (4)
auction involves a high minimum bid which gives rise to a positive probability of no sale. However, this is
not true if the support of buyers’ valuations is sufficiently bounded away from the seller’s own valuation.
12To prove this, not that bidding a higher score can only change something if x1 < x2, in which case
the price becomes negative. Similarly, one can show that it never pays to bid a lower score.
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We stress that the second-score auction is not incentive compatible if the value
of innovations is not verifiable to third parties. However, in the present framework,
first- and second-score auctions are payoff equivalent since the value of innovation is
the result of a pure random draw and at the time of bidding bidders only choose their
financial bid bi . Therefore, we can view the second-score auction as a proxy for the
first-score auction, which allows us to highlight the performance of auctions without
getting entangled in unnecessarily complex bidding strategies.13
In the optimal second-score auction, the procurer levies an entry fee, f , which
bidders have to pay in advance to register for the auction, before they draw their inno-
vation.
The equilibrium expected price, entry fee, and payoffs are
p := E[P]= E [X(1)− X(2)] (expected price) (5)
f = 1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c (entry fee) (6)
πp = E[X(1)]− p+2 f = E[X(1)]−2c = π∗p (7)
πi =
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c− f = 0. (8)
Obviously, the optimal auction and the optimal tournament are payoff equivalent.
Note, the registration or entry fee is collected before innovators draw their innova-
tion. Only registered innovators can participate in the auction.14
Comparing the procurer’s expected profits, we conclude,
Proposition 1 (revenue equivalence). Under perfect commitment the two mechanisms
are equally profitable for the procurer and achieve full surplus extraction.
Whereas the auction achieves full surplus extraction only by charging entry fees,
the optimal fixed-prize tournament can do without entry fees.
4 Auction vs. fixed-prize tournament under imperfect commitment
Now assume the procurer cannot commit to never trade with an innovator who did not
participate in the contest. In that case, innovators may bypass the contest and engage
in bargaining after the mechanism game has been played. We analyze the optimal auc-
tion and the optimal standard fixed-prize tournament (without entry fees) and show,
among other results, that the optimal fixed-prize tournament may outperform the opti-
mal auction, even if the tournament does not employ entry fees. In the later section 5
we also allow the procurer to charge an entry fee in fixed-prize tournament.
4.1 Optimal fixed-prize tournament (without entry fees)
We now characterize the optimal standard fixed-prize tournament without entry fees,
assuming the procurer cannot commit to never trade with an innovator who did not
13Note, this revenue-equivalence of first- and second-score auctions does not apply in models of scor-
ing auctions in which bidders choose the value of their innovation by choosing effort and price (as in the
models by Che and Gale, 2003, Scho¨ttner, 2008).
14In procurement this corresponds to the commonly employed short-listing procedure.
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participate in the mechanism. We show that for each given prize p the game played
between innovators has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which innovators play a
cutoff strategy, γi ∈ [0,1], i.e., submit their innovation if xi ≤ γi , and bypass if xi > γi .
If p is sufficiently high, innovators play the equilibrium strategies (submit, submit),
i.e., γ = 1, whereas if p is sufficiently low, they play the equilibrium strategy 0< γ <
1.
Lemma 1. γ = 1 is innovators’ equilibrium strategy if and only if p ≥ p¯, where
p¯ := 1
2
∫ 1
0
G(x)dx = 1
2
(1− E[X ]). (9)
Proof. (submit, submit), i.e., γ = 1, is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if
π(submit, submit | x, p)≥ π(bypass, submit | x, p)
G(x)p ≥ G(x)E[1/2(x−Y ) | Y < x]
p ≥ 1
2
∫ x
0
G(y)
G(x)
dy = 1
2
H(x)
H ′(x)
.
Recall that H(x) := ∫ x
0
G(y)dy is log-concave; hence, H(x)/H ′(x) is increasing, and
thus,
p¯ := inf
{
p | p ≥ 1
2
H(x)
H ′(x)
,∀x
}
= 1
2
H(1)
G(1)
= 1
2
(1− E[X ]).
Now suppose p< p¯. We show in two lemmas that for each p< p¯ the game played
between innovators has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which both innovators play
the same cutoff strategy 0< γ < 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose one innovator, say innovator 2, plays the cutoff strategy γ2. Then,
the best response of innovator 1 is also a cutoff strategy γ1.
This lemma implies that, as we analyze the best response to a cutoff strategy, we
can restrict our attention to cutoff strategies. The proof of this lemma is in Appendix
A.1.
In order to solve the symmetric equilibrium cutoff strategy γ , consider one player,
say player 1, who contemplates the deviating strategy γ1 ≥ γ , while his rival, player
2, plays the equilibrium strategy γ . To compute the payoff function of player 1,
π1(γ1,γ ), take a look at the state space representation of that innovator’s payoffs in
Figure 1. Using the joint density g12(x1, x2) = g(x1)g(x2), one can then compute the
payoff function by integrating over the relevant subsets of the state space [0,1]×[0,1]:
π1(γ1,γ )= p
(∫ γ
0
∫ x1
0
dG(x2)dG(x1)+
∫ γ1
γ
∫ γ
0
dG(x2)dG(x1)
+
∫ γ1
0
∫ 1
γ
dG(x2)dG(x1)
)
+ 1
2
∫ 1
γ1
∫ γ
0
(x1− x2)dG(x2)dG(x1)
+ 1
2
∫ 1
γ1
∫ x1
γ
(
x1−
1
2
x2
)
dG(x2)dG(x1)− c
(10)
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Figure 1: Payoffs of innovator 1 for γ1 ≥ γ in the state space [0,1]× [0,1]
Lemma 3. Assume p < p¯. The game played between innovators has a unique sym-
metric equilibrium strategy γ ∈ (0,1], which is implicitly defined as the solution of
p = 1
2
∫ γ
0
G(x)dx . (11)
γ is strictly increasing in p for all 0< p < p¯.
Proof. Consider one contestant, say contestant 1. We need to show that for each given
p, the γ implicitly defined in Lemma 3 satisfies the equilibrium requirement
γ = arg max
0≤γ1≤1
π1(γ1,γ ). (12)
For this purpose, first consider “upward” deviations from the equilibrium, γ1 ≥ γ ,
as in (10). Computing the partial derivative of π1 w.r.t. γ1 gives
∂π1
∂γ1
= p (G(γ )g(γ1)+ (1−G(γ ))g(γ1))
− 1
2
g(γ1)
∫ γ
0
(γ1− x2)dG(x2)
− g(γ1)
∫ γ1
γ
(
1
2
γ1−
1
4
x2
)
dG(x2)
(13)
∂π1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
=
(
p− 1
2
∫ γ
0
G(x)dx
)
g(γ )=: ξ(p,γ )g(γ ). (14)
Using the Lagrange function L := π1+λ(1−γ1), with the Lagrangian λ, and invoking
the equilibrium requirement that γ must be such that the best response of innovator 1
to γ is γ1 = γ (see (12)), the equilibrium strategy γ must solve the Kuhn-Tucker (KT)
9
conditions
∂L
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= ∂π1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
−λ= 0
∂L
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= 1−γ ≥ 0 and ∂L
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
λ= 0.
(15)
For p ≥ p¯ one finds (omitting the subscript 1) ∂π/∂γ |γ=1 ≥ 0; hence, the KT con-
ditions are solved by (γ = 1,λ= ∂π/∂γ |γ=1). This confirms Lemma 1.
For 0 < p < p¯ one finds (omitting the subscript 1) ∂π/∂γ |γ=1 < 0; hence, the KT
conditions are solved by (0<γ < 1,λ= 0), where γ is implicitly defined as the unique
solution of equation (11).
A similar argument deals with “downward” deviations, γ1 ≤ γ ; it yields the same
results.
Uniqueness of the solution for p < p¯ follows from the fact that ξ(p,γ ) is strictly
decreasing in γ and that γ = 0⇒ ξ(p,γ )= p> 0 and γ = 1⇒ ξ(p,γ )= p− 1/2(1−
E[X ]) < 0. Monotonicity of γ (p) follows easily.
Finally, we show that the unique solution of the condition
∂π1
∂γ1
∣∣∣∣
γ1=γ
= ξ(p,γ )g(γ )= 0
is indeed a maximizer of the payoff of innovator 1 (assuming innovator 2 also plays the
strategy γ ). We prove this by showing that the function π1(γ1,γ ) is pseudoconcave in
γ1.
15 For this purpose, compute the cross derivative, using (13):
∂2
∂γ1∂γ
π1 =
1
4
γ g(γ1)g(γ )≥ 0.
Together with the monotonicity of ξ(p,γ ) in γ , it follows that
γ1 < γ ⇒
∂
∂γ1
π1(γ1,γ )≥
∂
∂γ1
π1(γ1,γ1)= ξ(p,γ1)g(γ1) > ξ(p,γ )g(γ1)= 0
γ1 > γ ⇒
∂
∂γ1
π1(γ1,γ )≤
∂
∂γ1
π1(γ1,γ1)= ξ(p,γ1)g(γ1) < ξ(p,γ )g(γ1)= 0.
Therefore, π1(γ1,γ ) is increasing to the left of its stationary point (for γ1 < γ ) and
decreasing to the right of its stationary point (for γ1 > γ ). Hence, the stationary point
is a global maximum.
Using this result, we now compute the procurer’s payoff as a function of γ , elim-
inating the variable p. For this task, take a look at Figure 2, where the procurer’s
profits are represented in the order statistics space. The joint p.d.f. of X(1), X(2) is
g(1,2)(x, y) = 2g(x)g(y). Therefore, one obtains, after a bit of rearranging, for all
γ ≤ 1 (resp. p ≤ p¯):
πp(γ )= 2
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− p)g(x)g(y)dydx+2
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(
x+ y
2
− p
)
g(y)g(x)dydx
+2
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y
)
g(y)g(x)dydx .
(16)
15On pseudoconcavity see Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang (1988, p. 93 ff.).
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Figure 2: Payoffs of the procurer in the order statistics space
Whereas for p ≥ p¯ (resp. γ = 1) one has
πp = E[X(1)]− p. (17)
The optimal fixed-prize tournament maximizes the procurer’s expected profit over
γ , resp. p, subject to the constraint that innovators’ equilibrium expected payoff is
nonnegative.
Example 1. Suppose G(x) ≡ x (uniform distribution) and c ≤ 15/128. Then, p¯ =
1/2
∫ 1
0
ydy = 1/4, innovators’ equilibrium strategy is
γ (p)=
{
2
√
p if p < 1/4
1 if p ≥ 1/4
the procurer’s payoff function, as a function of p, is πp(γ ) = 5/12+ γ 2/4− γ 3/2+ γ 4/4,
the optimal fixed-prize tournament is
γ ∗ = arg max
γ
πp(γ )= 1/2, resp. p∗ = 1/16,
and innovators’ equilibrium payoff is π∗i = 15/128− c ≥ 0 (see Figure 3).
We mention:
Corollary 1. The introduction of imperfect commitment
1. reduces the procurer’s payoff if and only if c < p¯/2,
2. does not affect the procurer’s payoff if and only if c ≥ p¯/2.
If the cost of innovation is sufficiently high, specifically if c ≥ p¯/2, the optimal
prize under perfect commitment, p∗ = 2c, is equal or greater than p¯, so that the opti-
mal fixed-prize tournament under perfect commitment implies that γ = 1 even under
11
imperfect commitment. Therefore, in that case bypass is not an issue, and the optimal
mechanism under imperfect commitment is the same as that under perfect commit-
ment.
However, for all c < p¯/2, the lack of perfect commitment entails either γ < 1 or
p > p∗, and thus reduces the procurer’s expected profit.
4.2 Optimal scoring auction
A bypass can occur in two ways: either the innovator does not register for the auction,
yet innovates and engages in bargaining after the auction, or he registers for the auc-
tion, draws an innovation but then abstains from bidding and engages in bargaining
after the auction. Of course, an innovator can always not register and not innovate,
which we refer to as quit.
Innovators’ equilibrium play is determined by the procurer’s choice of entry fee.
We will show that the optimal entry fee induces both innovators to register, innovate,
and bid, so that in equilibrium no bypass ever occurs. The only effect of imperfect
commitment is that the procurer lowers the entry fee below the rate that is optimal
under full commitment,16 and in this (and only in this) way suffers from the lack of
commitment.17
The procurer’s choice of participation fee, f , induces either an equilibrium in
which both innovators play register or, as f is increased, an equilibrium in which
only one innovator registers or, as f is further increased, an equilibrium in which no
innovator plays register. We now show, in a sequence of lemmas, that the optimal par-
ticipation fee induces both innovators to register, and determine the maximum payoff
of the procurer.
In a first lemma we show that bypass in the form of not submitting a bid after hav-
ing registered for the auction can be ruled out by elimination of dominated strategies:
Lemma 4. Suppose an innovator has registered for the auction and paid the entry fee.
Then, participation in the auction dominates bypass for all values of the innovation.
Proof. Consider an innovator who has registered for the auction and then has drawn
innovation x . Suppose the other innovator has also registered for the auction. Then
participation in the auction yields a strictly higher payoff than bypass, since
π(x | participate)=
∫ x
0
(x− y)g(y)dy
>
∫ x
0
1
2
(x− y)g(y)dy
= π(x | bypass).
Next, suppose the other innovator did not register. Then, participation is even more
profitable than bypass, since being the only bidder yields a price for the innovation
equal to the full value of the innovation x . Therefore, conditional upon registration,
participation in the auction is the dominant strategy.
16The restriction imposed on entry fees by the possibility of bypass is similar to the restriction based
on listing fees due to search costs in auction hosting site pricing (see Deltas and Jeitschko, 2007).
17As we show later, in section 6, profitability of the auction cannot be increased by adopting a minimum
score requirement.
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We can thus reduce innovators’ strategies to: register’ (short for register and inno-
vate and submit), not register (short for not register and innovate and bargain), and quit
(short for not register and not innovate). Table 1 summarizes the payoffs of innovator
1 for all combinations of innovators’ strategies.
Innovator 2
register not register quit
register 12 E[X(1)− X(2)]− c− f E[X ]− c− f E[X ]− c− f
not register 12
1
2 E[X(1)− X(2)]− c 12 12 E[X(1)− 12 X(2)]− c 12 E[X ]− c
In
n
o
v
at
o
r
1
quit 0 0 0
Table 1: (Reduced form) entry game in the auction
Let
f ∗ := 1
4
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]
(18)
f ∗∗ := 1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]− c. (19)
Lemma 5. (Register, register) is innovators’ unique equilibrium strategy profile if
and only if f ≤ min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}. Moreover, if the procurer sets f = min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}, his
expected profit is equal to
π∗p =
{
E[X ] if c ≤ c¯
E[X(1)]−2c if c ≥ c¯
(20)
where c¯ := 1
4
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]
. (21)
Proof. Suppose innovator 2 plays register. Then, register’ is the best reply of innova-
tor 1 if and only if 1/2E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]− f −c ≥max{1/4E [X(1)− X(2)]−c,0} (see the
payoff matrix, Table 1). Solving these inequalities for f proves that register, register is
innovators’ equilibrium strategy if and only if f ≤min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}. In Appendix A.2 we
show that if f ≤min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}, register’ is actually the dominant strategy of innovator
1. Therefore, register, register is the unique equilibrium in this case.
Suppose the procurer sets f =min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}. If c≤ c¯, one has min{ f ∗, f ∗∗} = f ∗,
and the procurer’s payoff is equal to
πp = E[X(1)]− E[X(1)− X(2)]+2 f
= E[X(2)]+
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)+ X(2)]= E[X ].
(22)
If c ≥ c¯, one has min{ f ∗, f ∗∗} = f ∗∗, and the procurer’s payoff is equal to
πp = E[X(1)]− E[X(1)− X(2)]+2 f = E[X(1)]−2c. (23)
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Lemma 6. If the procurer sets an entry fee, f , that induces an asymmetric equilibrium
in which one innovator registers while the other plays not register, his payoff is equal
to
πp =
1
4
E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2)]+ f < π∗p. (24)
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Lemma 7. If the procurer sets an entry fee, f , that induces an equilibrium in which
both innovators play not register, his payoff is
πp =
1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]< π
∗
p. (25)
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.4.
We mention that this result implies that pure bargaining (which is obtained by
inducing both innovators to play not register) is strictly less profitable for the procurer
than the optimal auction.
Combining these lemmas implies:
Proposition 2 (optimal auction). The optimal auction involves the registration fee,
f = min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}, which induces all innovators to register, innovate, and bid (no by-
pass). The procurer’s expected profit is equal to
πap =
{
E[X ] if c ≤ c¯
E[X(1)]−2c if c ≥ c¯.
(26)
Corollary 2. The introduction of imperfect commitment
1. reduces the procurer’s payoff from E[X(1)]−2c to E[X ] if c < c¯
2. does not affect the procurer’s payoff if c ≥ c¯.
The intuition for this result is as follows: a sufficiently high cost of innovation en-
tails a low entry fee in the optimal auction under perfect commitment; at sufficiently
low entry fees, bypass is not an issue; therefore, when the cost of innovation is suffi-
ciently high, the lack of commitment power does not affect the optimal auction. This is
similar to how the lack of commitment affects the optimal fixed-prize tournament, de-
pending on the cost of innovation. Note however, that the smallest cost that neutralizes
the lack of commitment is not the same in the two mechanisms. Moreover, when the
lack of commitment has bite, it has a different impact on the procurer’s payoff across
the two mechanisms, as we show now.
4.3 Which mechanism is more profitable?
We now compare the profitability of the optimal auction and the optimal standard
fixed-prize tournament (without entry fees). The main purpose will be to identify
cases in which the tournament is more profitable, even without entry fees. This result
will be used to prove the optimality of the fixed-prize tournament in section 5, where
we allow the procurer to employ entry fees also in the fixed-prize tournament.
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In the following it is useful to distinguish probability distributions that either sat-
isfy the following condition:
η(ξ) := E
[
3
2
X(1)−
1
2
X(2) | X ≤ ξ
]
< ξ, ∀ξ ∈ (0,1]. (27)
or violate it for ξ = 1. Condition (27) is satisfied for a variety of standard probability
distributions, ranging from truncated normal to uniform distribution, and it is violated
if probability mass is concentrated on high values (as explained in more detail below).
We first state a sufficient condition for the superiority of the optimal auction:
Proposition 3. The optimal scoring auction is more profitable than the optimal fixed-
prize tournament (without entry fees), πap ≥ π cp, if η(ξ) < ξ for all ξ , as illustrated
below.
p
a ! pc
c
p
c  p*
c0
p
a  p* pa  p*
p/2
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The proof is in Appendix A.5.
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Figure 3: Comparing the optimal auction with the optimal fixed-prize tournament
(without entry fees), assuming a uniform distribution
This result is illustrated for the example of the uniform distribution in Figure 3,
assuming c = 1/15. There, the solid curve plots the procurer’s expected profit in the
fixed-prize tournament, as a function of the prize p. It has a kink at p = p¯ = 1/4
(which is the smallest prize that prevents bypass). The optimal prize is equal to p =
1/16, which is substantially lower than the optimal prize under perfect commitment
(p∗ = 2/15), and the optimal γ is equal to γ ∗ = 1/2. Therefore, in the optimal fixed-
prize tournament, all innovations X > 1/2 bypass the tournament. Evidently, the lack
of perfect commitment hurts the procurer in the fixed-prize tournament as well as in the
auction. However, in the optimal fixed-prize tournament, the procurer tolerates bypass
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of the best innovations by setting p < p¯, resp. γ < 1, because preventing bypass by
setting p = p¯ would be too costly. This induces a distortion, unlike in the optimal
auction, where bypass is never a problem, because the entry fee is set sufficiently low
to avoid bypass. Altogether, the lack of commitment is considerably more costly in
the optimal fixed-prize tournament than in the optimal auction.
However, the more important finding is that the optimal fixed-prize tournament can
be more profitable than the optimal auction, even if the tournament does not include
entry fees:
Proposition 4. The optimal fixed-prize tournament (without entry fees) is more prof-
itable than the optimal auction, π cp ≥ πap , if η(1) > 1, as illustrated below.
p
c ! pa
c
p
a  p*
c0
p
c  p* pc  p*
p/2
S S
SS
SS
S S
Proof. The assumption η(1) > 1 implies c¯ > p¯/2 (the proof is similar to part 1) of the
proof of Proposition 3 (see Appendix A.5). It follows immediately that for all c ≥ c¯
one has πap = π cp = π∗p . Therefore, it only remains to be shown that c < c¯⇒ π cp > πap .
Suppose c < c¯. Then, πap = E[X ], and since π cp ≥ π cp
∣∣
p= p¯ = E[X(1)]− p¯ (i.e. the
procurer’s maximum expected profit cannot be lower than that from setting the prize
p = p¯ that induces γ = 1), one has:
π cp−πap ≥ π cp
∣∣
p= p¯−π
a
p
= E[X(1)]− p¯− E[X ]
= 1
2
(
3
2
E[X(1)]−
1
2
E[X(2)]−1
)
= 1
2
(
η(1)−1
)
> 0,
(28)
as asserted.
Two conditions must be met to find a probability distribution that satisfies the suf-
ficient condition for the superiority of the fixed-prize tournament, η(1) > 1: the distri-
bution must exhibit a concentration of probability mass on high values and a relatively
high spread between the order statistics X(1), X(2). In order to understand these re-
quirements, it is useful to compute the “cost of imperfect commitment” (defined as
the loss in profit due to imperfect commitment) in the auction resp. the tournament,
defined as 1a := π∗p−πap , resp. 1c := π∗p−π cp. Using (28), one finds
1a = π∗p− E[X ]=
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]−2c (29)
1c ≤ π∗p− πp
∣∣
p= p¯ =
1
2
(1− E[X ])−2c =: 1¯c. (30)
Evidently, the loss of imperfect commitment in the optimal tournament, 1c, can
be made small by choosing a probability distribution that exhibits a concentration on
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Figure 4: c.d.f.’s of beta-distributions with a concentration on high values
high values, so that E[X ] is relatively large. However, in order to make the fixed-prize
tournament superior one also needs a relatively high cost of imperfect commitment in
the auction, 1a , in addition to a relatively low 1c. And that requires that the spread
between X(1) and X(2) be relatively large, as one can see immediately from (29)), (30).
The construction of the example plotted in Figure 4 is guided by this simple intu-
ition.18 There, we start with a beta-distribution that exhibits a concentration on high
values, leading to a high E[X ] and thus a low1c (see the figure on the left). However,
for this initial example, 1a is still lower than 1c, i.e., the auction is still superior to
the fixed-prize tournament. Thus we change the parameters of the beta-distribution in
such a way that E[X ] and thus 1c remain unchanged, while the spread between X(1)
and X(2) goes up, as one can see clearly by comparing the probability distributions of
the two order statistics on the left and right of Figure 4. That change in the spread
of the two order statistics is sufficiently strong to reverse the ranking of mechanisms,
making the optimal fixed-prize tournament superior to the optimal auction.19
We also mention that the superiority of the fixed-prize tournament for certain prob-
ability distributions resembles a result by Scho¨ttner (2008), who compared auctions
and tournaments under perfect commitment, when cost functions are subject to random
shocks, and entry fees are used neither in the auction nor in the fixed-prize tournament.
Scho¨ttner showed that fixed-prize tournaments may outperform auctions if the values
of innovations tend to differ a great deal.
5 Optimality of the fixed-prize tournament (with/without entry fees)
So far we have assumed a standard fixed-prize tournament in which the procurer offers
a prize, but does not require that contestants register and pay an entry fee. We now
examine how fixed-prize tournaments perform if they may include registration and en-
try fees, just like in auctions. The fixed-prize tournament is then characterized by two
parameters: the prize, p, and the entry fee, f . The innovator who registers and pays
18Incidentally, both distribution functions satisfy the assumed log-concavity of H(x) = ∫ x0 G(y)dy,
for all x .
19Similar examples can be found for the class of Kumaraswamy (1980) distributions, G(x) = 1−(
1− (x/γ )α)β that are often used in lieu of the beta-distribution. For α = 1,β = 1/5, one finds η(1)−1=
1/14> 0, and for all c≤ c¯ one finds πcp ≥ 73/84> 5/6= πap , which confirms the superiority of the optimal
fixed-prize tournament in this case.
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the entry fee acquires the option to submit his innovation; innovators who do not reg-
ister cannot submit. Altogether, we will show that the optimal fixed-prize tournament,
(p, f ), is more profitable for the procurer than the optimal auction. Thereby, we use
the convention to write the simple fixed-prize contest that does not require registration
(and does not collect entry fees) as (p,0).
We show that a fixed-prize tournament (p, f ) exists that always matches the ex-
pected profit of the optimal auction:
Proposition 5. The fixed-prize tournament ( pˆ, fˆ ),
pˆ = 1
2
− 1
4
E[X ] (31)
fˆ =
{
1
4
− 1
16
(
5E[X(1)]−3E[X(2)]
)
if c ≤ c¯
1
4
− 1
8
E[X ]− c if c ≥ c¯. (32)
achieves the same expected profit of the procurer as the optimal auction.
The following result gives an interpretation of pˆ and prepares the proof of this
proposition:
Lemma 8. The smallest prize that assures that an option to submit an innovation will
be exercised, regardless of the value of the innovation and regardless of whether the
other innovator also has the option to submit, is equal to pˆ, which exceeds p¯,
pˆ = 1
2
− 1
4
E[X ]> p¯. (33)
Proof. Suppose the innovator has the option to submit while his rival did not register.
Then, that innovator submits if and only if 1(p, x)≥ 0, for all x :
1(p, x) := πi (submit)−πi (bypass)
= p−G(x)E
[
1
2
(x− 1
2
Y ) | Y < x
]
= p− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= p− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ x
0
G(y)dy.
(34)
Evidently, 1(p, x) is strictly increasing in p and decreasing in x , and one has
1(p, x)|p= pˆ,x=1 = pˆ−
1
4
− 1
4
∫ 1
0
G(y)dy = pˆ− 1
2
+ 1
4
E[X ]= 0.
1(p, x)|p= p¯,x=1 =
1
4
(∫ 1
0
G(y)dy−1
)
<
1
4
(∫ 1
0
dy−1
)
= 0
Therefore, pˆ is the smallest prize that assures 1(p, x)≥ 0, for all x , and p¯ < pˆ, since
1( p¯, x) < 0 for high values of x .
Recall that p = p¯ is the smallest prize that assures 1(p, x) ≥ 0 for all x , if both
innovators have the option to submit. Since pˆ > p¯ it follows that p = pˆ also assures
that the innovator submits if both innovators have the option to submit.
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We are now ready to prove Proposition 5.
Proof. By construction of pˆ, an innovator who registers will later submit his innova-
tion to the tournament. Therefore, the simultaneous entry game can be described by
the following payoff matrix (since the game is symmetric we list only the payoffs of
innovator 1):20
Innovator 2
register not register quit
register 12 pˆ− f − c pˆ− c− f pˆ− f − c
not register 12
(
1
2 E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c 12 ( 12 E [X(1)− 12 X(2)])− c 12 E[X ]− c
In
n
o
v
at
o
r
1
quit 0 0 0
Table 2: (Reduced form) entry game in the fixed-prize tournament with entry fees
Suppose c ≤ c¯ = 1/4E[X(1)− X(2)]. Then, for f = fˆ one has
1
2
pˆ− fˆ − c = 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c ≥ 0
pˆ− fˆ − c > 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)−
1
2
X(2)
])
− c > 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c ≥ 0.
Therefore, register dominates ‘quit, and after eliminating quit, register dominates not
register. Hence, “register/register” is the unique equilibrium of the entry game, by
iterated elimination of dominated strategies, and the procurer’s equilibrium expected
profit is π cp = E[X(1)]− pˆ+2 fˆ = E[X ]= πap .
Similarly, in case c ≥ c¯ one has
1
2
pˆ− fˆ − c = 0≥ 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
])− c
pˆ− fˆ − c > 1
2
(
1
2
E
[
X(1)−
1
2
X(2)
])
− c ≥ 0
pˆ− fˆ − c > 0.
Again, “register/register” is also the unique equilibrium in this case and the procurer’s
equilibrium expected profit is π cp = E[X(1)]− pˆ+2 fˆ = E[X(1)]−2c = πap .
Having established that the optimal tournament is at least as profitable for the
procurer as the optimal auction, now recall that the optimal fixed-price tournament can
be more profitable than the optimal auction. Indeed,
20Suppose innovator 1 registers; if innovator 2 does not register or quits, 1 wins the prize for sure,
whereas if 2 registers as well, 1 wins the prize with probability 1/2. Suppose innovator 1 does not register
and thus speculates on bargaining; he wins only if he has the better innovation, which occurs with prob-
ability 1/2, and in that event the procurer’s threat point depends on whether innovator 2 has registered, as
explained before.
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Lemma 9. Suppose c < c¯. The simple contest, ( p¯,0), that does not require registra-
tion/entry fees is more profitable than the optimal auction if and only if η(1) > 1.
Proof. 1) In the proof of proposition 4 we have already shown that the simple fixed-
prize contest ( p¯,0) is more profitable than the optimal auction if η(1) > 1.
2) Assume π cp( p¯,0) > π
a
p . By proposition 5, π
a
p = π cp( pˆ, fˆ ), and therefore pˆ−
p¯ > 2 fˆ . Using the definitions of pˆ, fˆ , p¯, it follows, after a bit or rearranging, that
η(1)= E[3/2X(1)− 1/2X(2)]> 1, as asserted.
Corollary 3 (Optimality of the fixed-prize tournament). The optimal fixed-prize
tournament is never less and sometimes more profitable than the optimal auction.
The intuition for the surprising fact that the simple contest ( p¯,0) can be superior
to the fixed-prize contest ( pˆ, fˆ ) that replicates the optimal auction is as follows. When
no registration/entry fee is required, both innovators have the option to submit; there-
fore, in order to prevent bypass it is sufficient to employ the simple fixed-prize contest
( p¯,0), where p¯ is the smallest prize that assures submission when both innovators
have the option to submit. However, once registration/entry fees are imposed, prevent-
ing bypass requires not only that innovators always exercise an option to submit, but
also buy the option to submit, which may be more costly for the procurer.
p
f
0
pˆp¯
fˆ
f¯ (p)
P
Figure 5: Why entry fees may reduce the procurer’s expected profit
Figure 5 displays the set of all fixed-prize contests (p, f ) that prevent bypass and
their profitability for the procurer if η(1) > 1. The shaded area is the set of all (p, f )
that prevent bypass if registration/entry fees are required, P := {(p, f ) | p ≥ p¯,0 <
f ≤ f¯ (p)}, where f¯ (p) := p/2− 1/4E[X(1)− X(2)].21 The solid line and the parallel
dashed lines are indifference curves of the procurer (assuming both innovators play
“register/always submit”).
If no registration/entry fee is required, bypass is prevented by all fixed-prize con-
tests from the set {(p, f ) | p ≥ p¯, f = 0}, by definition of p¯. Since η(1) > 1 ⇒
( pˆ− p¯) > 2 f ,22 one can see that the optimal simple fixed-prize contest ( p¯,0) reaches
a higher level indifference curve than all fixed-prize contests (p, f ) ∈ P . In other
21Sketch of proof: Consider one innovator whose rival plays “register and always submit”. Then
“register and always submit” is a best reply if this strategy is more profitable than 1) “not submit (and
bargain), and than 2) “register and submit iff x ≤ γ ”. Requirement 1) is equivalent to f ≤ f¯ (p), and
requirement 2) is equivalent to p ≥ p¯.
22Continuously extend f¯ (p) to allow for f¯ (p) ≤ 0. Then, η(1) > 1⇒ f¯ ( p¯) = 1/4(1− E[3/2X(1)−
1/2X(2)])= 1/4(1−η(1)) < 0.
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words, preventing bypass becomes more costly if one replaces a simple fixed-prize
contest by one that requires registration/entry fees.
6 The auction cannot be improved by a minimum score
One may think that the profitability of the auction can be improved by adding a min-
imum score requirement, similar to the standard optimal auction problem where the
seller benefits from strategically setting a binding reserve price above his own valua-
tion.23
In order to examine this conjecture, suppose the procurer accepts only bids that
match or exceed a stated minimum score, which is denoted by R. This changes the
auction as follows: if exactly one bidder, say bidder 1, submits a score S1 = x1−b1 ≥
R, that bidder wins the auction and is paid a price equal to x1− R (instead of a price
equal to x1− x2); if no bidder submits a score equal to R or more, no trade occurs in
the auction; and if both bidders submit a score S ≥ R, the minimum score does not
bind, and the auction proceeds as before.
In the presence of a minimum score requirement, bidders play cutoff strategies and
bid if and only if the value of their innovation is equal or greater than a threshold value,
which is denoted by r . We look for a symmetric equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, a
bidder with value x = r must be indifferent between submitting a score S = R and not
bidding, and bidding must be profitable for all x > r , and unprofitable for all x < r .
Using the indifference condition for x = r yields the following unique and strictly
increasing relationship between the minimum score R and the threshold value r
R = 1
2
r + 1
4
E[X | X ≤ r ], (35)
which in turn allows us to eliminate the variable R, compute the procurer’s expected
profit as a function of r , and then maximize that payoff over r .
An analysis of the optimal auction with minimum score shows that the auction
cannot be improved by adding a minimum score. Indeed,
Proposition 6. The optimal minimum score is equal to zero; hence, the procurer can-
not raise his expected profit by employing a minimum score requirement in addition to
charging entry fees.
The proof is in Appendix A.6.
7 Discussion
In the present paper we analyze the procurement of innovations, assuming that the
procurer cannot commit to never bargain with innovators who did not participate in
the mechanism of his choice. We compare two methods of procurement from one of
two innovators: auctions vs. fixed-prize tournaments. We show that the optimal fixed-
prize tournament is more profitable than the optimal auction. While auctions are never
23Myerson (1981) showed that a binding reserve price that excludes participation of bidders with low
values is optimal for the seller except if buyers’ valuations are considerably larger than the seller’s own
valuation.
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attractive without positive entry fees, surprisingly a standard fixed-prize contest that
does not include entry fees can be more profitable than the optimal auction. More-
over, we show that one cannot improve the profitability of the auction by employing
minimum score requirement in addition to entry fees.
Our analysis assumes that the value of an innovation is not verifiable to third par-
ties. This excludes the use of contracts to procure innovations. It also precludes the
use of a discriminatory scoring rule as well as a second-score auction in which the
price paid by the procurer depends on the difference between the values of the two
best innovations. Nevertheless, since in the present framework first- and second-score
auctions are revenue equivalent, we are able to highlight the performance of auctions
without getting entangled in unnecessarily complex bidding strategies, by using the
second-score auction as a proxy for the first-score auction,
Our analysis has been carried out in a simple framework, with only two contestants
and a stylized innovation technology. In further research one may wish to extend
the analysis to cases in which it is optimal to short-list more than two contestants,
introduce asymmetries between innovators, either with respect to their cost functions
or with respect to the probability distributions from which they draw their innovations,
and extend the analysis to a common (or affiliated) value framework.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Suppose innovator 2 plays cutoff strategy γ2, and innovator 1 has drawn innovation
x1. In order to show that the best response of innovator 1 is also a cutoff strategy, it is
sufficient to prove the following statements:
1. if not submit is the best reply for x1, then not submit is also a best reply for all
innovation values greater than x1;
2. if submit is the best reply for x1, then submit is also a best reply for all innovation
values smaller than x1.
To prove the first statement, we distinguish between x1 < γ2 and x1 > γ2.
If x1 < γ2, the assumption that not submit is the best reply to γ2 is equivalent to
1
2
∫ x1
0
(x1− y)dG(y)≥ p (G(x1)+ (1−G(γ2)))
1
2
∫ x1
0
G(y)dy ≥ p (G(x1)+ (1−G(γ2)))
1
2
H(x1)
H ′(x1)
≥ p
(
1+ 1−G(γ2)
G(x1)
)
, by H(x)=
∫ x
0
G(y)dy.
Since H is log-concave, the LHS of the last inequality is increasing in x1 and the RHS
is decreasing in x1. Therefore, this inequality holds also for all innovations valued
higher than x1.
If x1 > γ2, the assumption that not submit is the best reply to γ2 is equivalent to
1
2
∫ γ2
0
(x1− y)dG(y)+
1
2
∫ x1
γ2
(
x1−
1
2
y
)
dG(y)≥ p.
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Evidently, the LHS of the last inequality is increasing in x1 and the RHS is constant.
Therefore, this inequality holds also for all innovations valued higher than x1.
The proof of the second statement is similar and hence omitted.
A.2 Supplement to the proof of Lemma 5
We have already shown in the proof of Lemma 5 that “register, register” is an equilib-
rium if f ≤min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}. Therefore, to prove the uniqueness of this equilibrium, we
only need to show that register is also a best reply to not register and to quit.
First, assume c ≤ c¯, i.e., f ≤ min{ f ∗, f ∗∗} = f ∗. Then register is a best reply to
not register since being the only bidder ensures that one earns the price equal to the
value of the own innovation, x , and thus a payoff equal to
π = E[X ]− f − c
≥ 1
2
E
[
X(1)+ X(2)
]− 1
4
E
[
X(1)− X(2)
]− c
= 1
4
E[X(1)]+
3
4
E[X(2)]− c > 0.
(36)
Whereas if one also plays not register, the payoff is
π ′ = 1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]− c.
Evidently, π > π ′, π > 0, and therefore register is the best reply to not register.
Similarly, if c ≥ c¯, one obtains min{ f ∗, f ∗∗} = f ∗∗, and hence
π ≥ E[X ]− c−
(
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− c
)
= 1
2
E[X(1)+ X(2)]= E[X ]> 0,
(37)
π ′ = 1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
)
− c
= 1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]− c
≤ 1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]−
1
4
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]
= 1
8
E[X(2)]< π.
(38)
Therefore, register is a best reply to not register, in all cases. Similarly, one can show
that register is a best reply to quit.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Suppose one innovator, say innovator 1, registers, while innovator 2 plays not register.
Then innovator 1 earns the expected payoff
π1 = E[X ]− f − c. (39)
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If innovator 1 deviates to not register, his payoff is
π ′1 =
1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
)
− c. (40)
And if he deviates to quit, his payoff is equal to zero. Therefore, in an asymmetric
equilibrium one must have: π1 ≥ π ′1 and π1 ≥ 0. These conditions are equivalent to
f ≤ 1
4
E[X(1)]+
5
8
E[X(2)], and f ≤ E[X ]− c. (41)
Similarly, the payoff of innovator 2 (who plays not register while innovator 1 plays
register) is
π2 =
1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
)
− c. (42)
If he deviates to quit, his payoff is equal to zero. Therefore, one must have π2 ≥ 0,
which implies
1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]≥ c. (43)
And if he deviates to register, his payoff is
π ′2 =
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]− f − c. (44)
Therefore, one must have: π2 ≥ π ′2. This condition is equivalent to
f ≥ 1
4
E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2)]. (45)
We conclude that such an asymmetric equilibrium is induced by all
f ∈
[
1
4
E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2),
1
4
E[X(1)]+
5
8
E[X(2)]
]
. (46)
It follows that in such an equilibrium the procurer’s expected profit is
πp = E[X(1)]− E[X ]+ f −
1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
)
= 1
4
E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2)]+ f.
(47)
If c ≤ c¯, it follows by (41) that
πp ≤
1
4
E[X(1)]−
3
8
E[X(2)]+
1
4
E[X(1)]+
5
8
E[X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]< E[X ]= π∗p.
(48)
And if c¯ ≤ c ≤ 1
4
E[X(1)]− 18E[X(2)], one finds,
π∗p = E[X(1)]−2c
≥ E[X(1)]−2
(
1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]
)
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]≥ πp.
(49)
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 7
If innovators innovate but do not register, innovators’ and the procurer’s payoffs are
π = 1
2
(
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
)
− c
= 1
4
E[X(1)]−
1
8
E[X(2)]− c ≥ 0
πp = E[X(1)]−
1
2
E[X(1)−
1
2
X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)].
(50)
Hence, one must have c ≤ 1/4E[X(1)]− 1/8E[X(2)].
If c ≤ c¯, one finds
π∗p = E[X ]=
1
2
E[X(1)+ X(2)]> πp. (51)
And if c¯ ≤ c ≤ 1/4E[X(1)]− 1/8E[X(2)], one has
π∗p = E[X(1)]−2c
≥ E[X(1)]−
1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]
= 1
2
E[X(1)]+
1
4
E[X(2)]= πp.
(52)
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We distinguish between c ≥ c¯ and c ≤ c¯.
1) Suppose c ≥ c¯. Since η(ξ) < ξ,∀ξ ∈ (0,1], one has in particular η(1) < 1. In
that case the procurer’s expected profit in the optimal auction is equal to E[X(1)]−
2c, by Proposition 2, which is exactly the same as in the optimal auction and in the
optimal fixed-prize tournament under perfect commitment. Since the optimal fixed-
prize tournament under imperfect commitment cannot be more profitable than under
perfect commitment, it follows that π cp ≤ πap .
If in addition η(1) < 1, one finds
3
2
E[X(1)]−
1
2
E[X(2)]< 1
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]+
1
4
E[X(1)+ X(2)]<
1
2
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]+
1
2
E[X ]<
1
2
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]<
1
2
(1− E[X ])
1
2
E[X(1)− X(2)]<
1
2
∫ 1
0
G(x)dx
2c¯ < p¯.
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Hence, p¯/2 > c¯. By Corollary 2 the auction is not affected by the lack of commitment
for all c ≥ c¯, whereas, by Corollary 1, the fixed-prize tournament is not affected only
for all c ≥ p¯/2. Hence, πap = π cp for all c ≥ c¯ and πap > π cp for all c ∈ [c¯, p¯/2]. (Recall,
under perfect commitment, the optimal fixed-prize tournament and the optimal auction
yield the same expected payoffs, by Proposition 1.)
2) Suppose c ≤ c¯. A direct payoff comparison yields 1 := π cp−πap < 0, by the
following reasoning:24
1=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(2x−2p)g (x)g (y)dydx+
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(x+ y−2p)g (y)g (x)dydx
+
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(
x+ 1
2
y
)
g (y)g (x)dydx−
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
(x+ y)g (x)g (y)dydx
=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(2x−2p)g (x)g (y)dydx+
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(x+ y−2p)g (y)g (x)dydx
+
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(
x+ 1
2
y
)
g (y)g (x)dydx
−
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x+ y)g (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
0
(x+ y)g (x)g (y)dydx
=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− y−2p)g (x)g (y)dydx+
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(x+ y−2p)g (y)g (x)dydx
+
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(
x+ 1
2
y
)
g (y)g (x)dydx
−
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
(x+ y)g (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
(x+ y)g (x)g (y)dydx
=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− y−2p)g (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
2pg (y)g (x)dydx
−
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
1
2
yg (y)g (x)dydx
=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− y)g (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
1
2
yg (y)g (x)dydx
−
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
2pg (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ γ
0
2pg (y)g (x)dydx
=
∫ γ
0
∫ x
0
(x− y)g (x)g (y)dydx−
∫ 1
γ
∫ x
γ
1
2
yg (y)g (x)dydx+ pG (γ )2−2pG (γ )
= 1
2
G(γ )2E
[
X(1)|X(1) ≤ γ
]− 1
2
E
[
X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ
]− 1
4
(1−G (γ ))2 E [X(2)|X(2) ≥ γ ] ·
+ pG (γ )2−2pG (γ )
= 1
2
G(γ )2E
[
X(1)|X(1) ≤ γ
]− 1
2
G(γ )2E
[
X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ
]− 1
2
(1−G(γ )2)E [X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ ]
24The first inequality follows from pG(γ )2 ≤ pG(γ ), E[X(1) | X(1) < γ ] ≤ E[X(1) | X < γ ], and
E[X(2) | X(1) < γ ]≥ E[X(2) | X < γ ].
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− 1
4
(1−G (γ ))2 E [X(2)|X(2) ≥ γ ]+ pG (γ )2−2pG(γ )
≤ 1
2
G (γ )2 E
[
X(1)− X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ
]− 1
2
(1−G(γ )2)E [X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ ]
− 1
4
E
[
X(2)|X(2) ≥ γ
]
(1−G (γ ))2−G(γ )1
2
G(γ )(γ − E[X |X ≤ γ ])
= 1
2
G(γ )2
(
E
[
X(1)− X(2)|X ≤ γ
]+ E[X |X ≤ γ ]−γ )
− 1
4
(1−G (γ ))2 E [X(2)|X(2) ≥ γ ]− 1
2
(1−G(γ )2)E [X(2)|X(1) ≤ γ ]
<
1
2
G(γ )2
(
E
[
X(1)− X(2)|X ≤ γ
]+ 1
2
E[X(1)+ X(2)|X ≤ γ ]−γ
)
= 1
2
G(γ )2
(
E
[
3
2
X(1)−
1
2
X(2)
∣∣∣∣ X ≤ γ
]
−γ
)
= 1
2
G(γ )2 (η(γ )−γ ) < 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
To ensure that the auction has a symmetric equilibrium in cutoff strategies, we as-
sume that K := −G is starshaped, which is weaker than concavity but stronger than
subadditivity of G. The function K is starshaped if for each α ∈ [0,1], and all x :
K (αx)≤ αK (x) (see Bruckner and Ostrow, 1962). Starshapedness implies that K (x)/x
is increasing, resp. G(x)/x is decreasing. This property is used in the proof below.
In a symmetric equilibrium, a bidder with value x = r is indifferent between sub-
mitting a score S = R and not bidding, and bidding is profitable for all x > r and
unprofitable for all x < r .
Indifference between bidding and not bidding for x = r means that
G(r)(r − R)= 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy.
This implies the relationship between R and r stated in (35).
Denote the difference between bidders’ payoff when bidding and not bidding by
1. Assume x > r . Then, using (35)
1= G(r)(x− R)+
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− R)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)x−G(r)r + 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ r
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − x)g(y)dy+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
(r − x)G(r)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
= 1
2
G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(y)dy
> 0.
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Similarly, one obtains for x ≤ r :25
1= G(r)(x− R)− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)x−G(r)r + 1
2
∫ r
0
(r − 1
2
y)g(y)dy− 1
2
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(y)dy
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ r
x
yg(y)dy
≤ G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
∫ r
x
xg(y)dy (since y ≤ x)
= G(r)(x− r)+ 1
2
rG(r)− 1
2
xG(x)− 1
4
x(G(r)−G(x))
= 3
4
xG(r)− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
2
rG(r)
≤ 1
2
xG(r)− 1
4
xG(x)− 1
2
rG(r)+ 1
4
rG(x) (since −G is starshaped)
=
(
G(r)− 1
2
G(x)
)(
1
2
x− 1
2
r
)
< 0
The addition of a minimum score implies restrictions on the entry fee. For a given
r the procurer sets the highest entry fee that ensures that both innovators register. Con-
sider an innovator whose rival registers. Denote his payoff if he also registers by π r
and if he does not register by πn . Then, the procurer sets the highest fee that ensures
π r ≥ πn and π r ≥ 0.
After some rearranging and changing the order of integration one finds
π r = 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(x− R)g(x)g(y)dydx− f − c
πn = 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ 1
y
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dxdy+ 1
2
∫ 1
r
∫ 1
y
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dxdy− c.
The highest entry fee, f ∗, that ensures π r ≥ πn is
f ∗ :=
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(
1
2
x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(
1
2
x− 1
4
y− R)g(x)g(y)dydx .
And the highest entry fee, f ∗∗, that ensures π r ≥ 0 is
f ∗∗ := 1
2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(x− 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx
+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
(x− y)g(x)g(y)dydx+
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
(x− R)g(x)g(y)dydx− c.
Therefore, the optimal entry fee is f =min{ f ∗, f ∗∗}.
25Note, for some interval of x values below r one has nevertheless x > R.
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Finally, compute the procurer’s expected profit, using the optimal registration fee
and the relationship between R and r , (35), writing πp as a function of r . If f
∗ ≤ f ∗∗,
one finds
πp = 2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+2
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
yg(x)g(y)dydx
+2
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
Rg(x)g(y)dydx+2 f ∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
(x+ 1
2
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
1
2
yg(x)g(y)dydx,
which is decreasing in r and thus reaches the maximum at r = 0, associated with
R = 0. Thus, in this case, the procurer cannot benefit from including a minimum score
requirement.
Similarly, if f ∗∗ ≤ f ∗,
πp = 2
∫ r
0
∫ x
0
(
1
2
x+ 1
4
y)g(x)g(y)dydx+2
∫ 1
r
∫ x
r
yg(x)g(y)dydx
+2
∫ 1
r
∫ r
0
Rg(x)g(y)dydx+2 f ∗∗
=
∫ 1
0
∫ x
0
2xg(x)g(y)dydx−2c
= E[X(1)]−2c.
Since E[X(1)]− 2c is the procurer’s expected profit in the auction without minimum
score, it follows also in this case that the procurer cannot benefit from a minimum
score requirement.
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